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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades in the Soviet Union there existed a secret 
that Soviet officials wanted kept within their borders. 
Political repression of Soviet citizens at the hands of the 
state was not an image Soviet officials wanted to portray to 
the people of the world. Though their preference for 
secrecy was not altogether realized, there remained much 
that people outside of the Soviet government did not know. 
It is a well known fact that some Soviet citizens who chose 
to practice their "guaranteed" political rights--freedom of 
speech, conscience, and association--were subjected to 
arrest and imprisonment. What is not well known is why this 
occurred. Some analysts, who have studied human rights 
abuse and the role it plays in development strategy, have 
assumed that repression is an instrument of development--an 
avenue for maintaining power while forcing growth, 
especially economic growth. Others have argued that 
repression for development leads to economic decline in the 
end. What is agreed upon is that development and growth 
should be a goal. How to get there is another story. This 
study explores the development path of the Soviet Union 
applying the concepts of economic and political development 
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and their relationship with political rights. In the final 
analysis, a conclusion is drawn that the Soviet government's 
lack of respect for political rights may in some way be 
related to the decline in their economy. 
Economic Development 
Before the 1960s, the emphasis on economic development 
and growth around the world was significant. The success or 
failure of a government was often judged by the speed of 
economic growth it had secured with its policies. This 
growth was equated with growth in Gross National Product 
(GNP) and capital accumulation. Governments were to throw 
their interests and dollars into the economy and development 
would occur (Haberler, 15; de Vey Mestagh, 146; Baldwin, 
64). By the 1960s, growth had become the overriding 
objective in "developed" and "less-developed" countries. 
This growth was to be achieved predominantly by industrial 
and technological development (Agazzi, 15). Years and years 
of economic research led economists to believe that 
increasing capital output, rates of investment and saving, 
and GNP subsequently led to development and a better way of 
life for a country's people (Singer, 3). 
Soviet development strategists, since the nation's 
birth, were enthralled by progression just as economists 
were around the world. Accordingly, each Soviet leader had 
his own version of how to affect rapid growth--particularly 
in the economy. Lenin's War Communism laid the first 
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foundation of a centrally planned economy where the Soviet 
state owned the means of production. Although he loosened 
the constraints of the centrally controlled economic system 
in his later years with the New Economic Policy, the idea of 
central planning would come back to the forefront with 
Stalin's strategy for rapid economic growth (Braverman, 9). 
During the 1930s the Stalinist system was put into 
place and was carried out through the 1940s. The design 
included a large percentage of Soviet GNP going to 
investment. This investment was concentrated in areas where 
each unit of capital brought a high return in added output--
primarily heavy industry with capital-intensive technologies 
and a military bias (ibid. 15; Montias, 58). Throughout 
this time the Soviet economy grew significantly with an 
annual growth rate of around 5.9 percent while the state 
continued its all-embracing role in economic activity 
(Millar 1990, 187). 
Pre-1965 economic research, which included the theory 
that development would occur and sustain if states 
concentrated on growth in GNP, took a blow after many social 
problems continued to exist even in those countries that 
experienced significant economic growth. This occurrence 
was much to the economists' dismay as they had believed for 
years that once a country achieves relatively high levels of 
economic development, higher levels of economic development 
and improved living standards would follow. In addition, 
there were economies that did not grow as expected (Singer, 
3; Huntington and Nelson, 42). 
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The Soviet situation was an example of the above 
circumstance. At the conclusion of World War II the Soviet 
Union had been thrust into world politics and was considered 
a major force. The economy, however, was twenty percent 
smaller than it had been at the war's outset (Millar 1981, 
50). Throughout the 1950s, investment was twenty-five 
percent of GNP with a continued emphasis on heavy industry. 
Nonetheless, the economic growth rates in the Soviet Union 
began a pattern of steady decline that continued for decades 
(Braverman, 15; See Appendix A for growth percentages in 
GNP). 
Many analysts have contemplated the various reasons for 
the slow-down in Soviet economic growth. Some argued that 
the decline in per annum growth was due to maturity. The 
Soviet economy had become more complex and complexity may 
cause growth rates to drop and then become level (Millar 
1981, 180). Others contended that the Stalinist model of 
fast paced, forced industrialization was the culprit, for 
the economy could not sustain such rapid growth over long 
periods of time (Cohn, 24). Some charged that the extreme 
centralization of the economy ignored individual initiative 
and, therefore, stagnation occurred (Heinz, 11). Still 
others maintained that the Soviet economic system was too 
inflexible and the growth strategy lacked reform that 
resembled capitalistic change (Guha, 104). While these 
arguments are viable and worth consideration as reasons for 
the decline in Soviet economic growth, there remain still 
other explanations that require exposure. These other 
explanations may be found in political rather than economic 
form. 
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In the late 1960s there was a "vigorous denunciation of 
the growth-oriented development economics of the previous 
twenty-five years" (Arndt, 91). Social problems were 
growing worse even when economies were maintaining growth. 
Some economies were also ceasing to grow and began showing 
decline (ibid). The trend in development literature took a 
turn as the new emphasis became political development as 
well as economic development. Economists, as well as other 
social scientists, acknowledged the notion that governments 
should focus on political growth in order to maintain 
economic growth. Their studies have found "quite striking 
confirmation that a high level of political development 
tends to be a favorable pre-condition for more economic 
growth" (Singer, 5). In short, political conditions could 
play a decisive role in impeding or facilitating advances in 
economic growth (Baran, Buchanan, Benjamin,Hirschman, and 
Ward). 
Political Development 
Political development predominantly involves the 
development of an autonomous political infrastructure 
(Almond and Powell, 46). This involves the creation of 
political institutions, "stable, valued, and recurring 
patterns of behavior," that are adaptable, independent and 
able to absorb the participation of society (Huntington, 
266). The structure of these institutions can reduce or 
increase a state's ability to change and develop (Lipset, 
103). 
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Political institutions take many forms. First, with 
respect to government system performance, institutional 
development involves administrative and legal development. 
An autonomous legal system based on the rule of law must be 
created (Pye, 33-45; Bill and Hardgrave, 67-68). Second, 
with respect to the population as a whole, development 
includes "a change from widespread subject status [citizens 
being subject to the decisions of government without having 
any voice or representation] to an increasing number of 
contributing citizens, with an accompanying spread of 
autonomous mass participation" (Pye, 13). The state, in 
turn, must develop the capacity to deal with the 
participation of its citizens, whether it is in the form of 
support or dissent, and allow this participation to play a 
role in official decisions (Huntington and Nelson, 3). 
Lastly, political development requires a wider acceptance of 
universalistic standards of law. These standards are 
generally a product of the international community as set 
forth by international organizations such as the United 
Nations. A developed political system should, therefore, 
include a wide acceptance of the standards that emanate from 
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accepted and respected bodies of international organization 
in which a nation-state claims membership (Pye 1965, 13; Pye 
1966, 37; Claude). 
Political Rights. When surveying the requirements of 
political development mentioned above, the notions of an 
autonomous legal system based on the rule of law, autonomous 
political participation, and acceptance of universalistic 
law lead to the concept of human rights--in particular 
political human rights. Many universal documents (and 
national constitutions) provide for these certain political 
rights that all citizens of a participating government in an 
international system shall enjoy and that governments shall 
not restrict. Among these are the freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, freedom to dissent, freedom of conscience, thought 
and assembly (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
articles 7,9,10 18,19 20). These political rights and their 
relationship with political development are the concern for 
this study as it will be demonstrated that Soviet officials 
have done little over the years to protect these rights. In 
not doing so the Soviet state did not meet the requirements 
of political development and, thereby, may have produced in 
part the decline in their economy. 
When the notion of political rights was considered 
along with the concept of development there emerged two 
competing paradigms. First, early development literature 
exposed the fact that development requires significant 
growth and, because of this fact, justified the limiting of 
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political rights. The belief was that for development to 
succeed, political liberties must be repressed--even if 
temporarily (Meltzer, 60). Development and human rights 
were seen as competing concerns. Analysts then began to ask 
"Is repression necessary for rapid growth or development?" 
A new body of research emerged and the second pattern of 
thought was set forth with the idea that development 
.requires the active participation of the people. The 
deprivation of political rights destroys and undermines 
growth strategy rather than furthering it (Howard, 469; 
Meltzer, 60) Therefore, guaranteeing political rights was 
viewed as necessary and preferable for "the ultimate purpose 
of development is to lay the basis for realizing human 
dignity" (Donnelly, 202). 
As is well known, the Soviet state--which was a party 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and whose own 
constitution provided for numerous political rights--often 
repressed its own citizens for simply expressing their 
guaranteed rights. It is the contention of this author that 
by doing so they may have undermined their own growth. 
Abuse of political human rights is not a sign of healthy, 
stable political development. As mentioned above, recent 
studies have contended that political development is a pre-
requisite and necessity for economic growth. Therefore, the 
decline in Soviet economic growth may have been a result of 
the Soviet government's human rights behavior, which will be 
exposed further below. 
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Scope of Study, Methodology, and Other Definitions. The 
scope of this study is the economic and political situation 
in the Soviet Union from 1950 to 1990, but includes 
qualitative data from Stalin's years in power (1930s and 
1940s). It is to be presented as a case study in which 
economic development theory and political development theory 
were applied to Soviet economics and politics during these 
three decades. Soviet human rights data was used to 
indicate the level of political development that the Soviet 
government had achieved. 
The sources used for this project consist of both 
primary and secondary sources. Soviet economic data on the 
fulfillment of their economic plans was used in conjunction 
with International Monetary Fund reports, United States 
government documents, and scholarly studies of the Soviet 
economy for data concerning Soviet growth. Secondary 
historical accounts provided the bulk of information on 
Soviet politics, although several speeches given by Soviet 
leaders were used as well. First hand and second hand 
accounts of human rights practices, primarily published by 
international human rights organizations and former 
political prisoners, were used as information for Soviet 
human rights behavior. The possibility of western bias, 
particularly in the economic data, may be noted. The 
studies used, however, are predominantly the most recent, 
most cited, and most respected studies on the Soviet 
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economy. The international human rights organizations from 
which political imprisonment data was taken should rarely be 
in question as these organizations are considered by most to 
be independent of any political influence from any one 
government. 
Gross National Product has been used in this study to 
indicate and monitor economic growth in the Soviet Union as 
this is the most commonly accepted and accessible method. 
An obvious weakness with this method is that there is often 
difficulty in finding a consensus on Soviet economic 
figures. Soviet figures have been found by many analysts to 
be unreliable and are often adjusted in western studies to 
reflect more accurate levels. Those adjusted figures are 
used as data for this study. 
This study has relied on the numbers of political 
imprisonments--those people that have been imprisoned solely 
for political activity-~as an indicator of human rights 
practices as this is the method of most international human 
rights organizations and governments. As with economic 
figures, the numbers of political imprisonments have also 
been quite difficult to pinpoint as the occurrence of such 
imprisonments was considered by the Soviets to be a state 
secret. International organizations, such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, compile reports of 
political imprisonments around the world, but they sometimes 
have to rely on secondary sources and accounts. The problem 
of complete accuracy, therefore, is an acknowledged 
weakness. 
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Other terms that may require some clarification, as 
they may be mentioned frequently throughout this study, 
include totalitarianism, Soviet government and party. In 
this study, as in many others, the Soviet system that 
existed during the specified time period is referred to as a 
totalitarian system. Most aspects of Soviet society were 
directed and monitored from the center. The center was 
composed of a unique relationship between the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet government. 
Since the beginning of Soviet history, until its demise, the 
CPSU was the overriding force in Soviet society. Though the 
Soviet government existed, it was directed by the CPSU. For 
practical purposes, this study uses the term Soviet 
"government" when explaining human rights policy practices. 
The basic understanding should be that government policies 
originated in the party and passed from it to the government 
administration and then to the people. 
The remainder of this project consists of three 
chapters that follow. Chapter two provides a review of the 
relevant literature concerning economic development, 
political development, and human rights and development. 
Chapter three reports the findings of the study pertaining 
to the Soviet Union. An overview of the Soviet economic 
system, including its growth and decline, is provided, as is 
an overview of Soviet politics. The relevant aspects of 
political development are reviewed beginning with the 
existence of political rights in the Soviet Union, as 
exposed in a discussion of the Soviet Constitution. The 
judicial system and criminal codes are then discussed 
leading to the phenomena of political trials and political 
imprisonments as they occurred in the Soviet Union. The 
universal documents, to which the Soviet government was a 
party, are then revealed. The third chapter is concluded 
with a more detailed discussion of the Gorbachev era 
exposing some of the changes and reforms that took place 
during his time in power. The fourth and final chapter 
provides an analysis of the Soviet situation applying 
economic development and political development theory to 
draw the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic Development 
At the end of the 1940s, emphasis around the world was 
on development. Growth had become the overriding objective 
in the industrial countries of the West, as well as in the 
"less-developed" world and in the Communist countries of the 
East. Subsequently, the success or failure of governments 
was often judged by the rate of economic growth--increases 
in GNP, GNP per capita, and output per capita--they had 
secured, or failed to secure, by their economic policies. 
The assumption was that high levels of economic growth would 
lead to higher levels of economic growth. In turn, high 
levels of economic growth would lead to a better way of life 
for a country's people. They would enjoy, not only the 
basic necessities of life, but greater freedom and equality 
(Baeck, 37; Haberler, 15-17; Huntington and Nelson, 42). 
The most compelling case for economic growth, according to 
one author, is that "it gives man greater control over his 
environment, and thereby increases his freedom" (Arndt, 
177). Economic growth would be beneficial, providing for a 
stable society, for both the country's government and its 
citizens. 
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In the early development literature, many goals were 
set forth that, if implemented through policy, were to pave 
the way to economic growth. The first was often reduced to 
the expansion of two factors: the size of the labor force 
and the productivity of each worker. Growth would be 
maximized when putting the maximum number of people to work 
and allocating resources in such a way that the outcome is 
the greatest possible increase in total and per capita 
output (Braverman, 17; Bruton, 19; Swianiewicz, 270; 
Galbraith, 6). 
A second goal was that of selective growth. Resources 
and manpower should be focused in certain areas that will 
guarantee a high return on the investment--namely industry 
and technology. Industrial and technological development, 
therefore, became the center of most growth strategies as 
agriculturally based economies were seen as less efficient 
and "less-developed" (Agazzi, 19; Galbraith, 7). 
The road to achieving long-term economic growth, 
according to some theorists, included the maintenance of 
price stability. In addition, there should be no 
recessions, imbalances, or fluctuations over the long run. 
Economic policy that strives for these long-term goals will 
maintain and enjoy steady growth over many years (Erdos, 
105, 109, 110; Dobb, 8; Haberler, 16, 17). 
One of the latest, and most often cited, pieces that 
sets forth economic policy goals for economic growth looks 
at growth as a process that occurs in five stages. The 
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first stage is that of a traditional society. At this level 
the economy suffers from low output per capita because of 
backward technology. As development strategy is implemented 
and.takes hold a traditional society moves to the second 
stage termed "pre-conditions for take-off." At this point 
there should be a rise in cap~tal accumulation. The 
accumulation of capital is vital, for without it growth is 
rarely possible. Once capital is accumulated, a society 
then moves to the third, or "the take-off" stage. This 
level should last nearly twenty years. Growth, during this 
stage, becomes institutionalized as a normal condition. The 
"drive to maturity" is the next level where modern 
technology spreads and "an economy demonstrates that is has 
the technological and entrepreneurial skill to produce not 
everything, but anything it chooses to produce" (Rostow, 
68). This "drive" occurs in approximately forty years. 
During the fifth and final stage, the "age of high mass-
consumption," there is a shift towards the production of 
durable consumers' goods and services. Food, shelter, and 
clothing are no longer main consumption objectives (ibid). 
The ultimate key to the above five stages, and in many 
other studies as well, is capital accumulation. A nation 
must accumulate capital before any development or growth 
strategy of increasing GNP can take place (Baldwin, 
Braverman, Bruton, Galbraith, Haberler, and Rostow). In 
short, money was the answer to the development question. 
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After years and years of emphasis on increasing capital 
to increase GNP and output, purely economic factors, an 
emphasis on non-economic factors began to emerge. Extensive 
studies that explored the strategies and levels of economic 
growth in developing countries often found that the original 
hypothesis, concerning the move from capital accumulation to 
growth in GNP to a better way of life for a country's 
people, was not heavily supported. Experience showed that 
even if there was an increase in GNP and the material 
condition, there was not necessarily a guarantee of an 
improved human condition. The people living in developing 
areas did not necessarily enjoy a higher standard of living 
or greater freedom, which was the contention of early 
development research (de Vey Mestdagh, 146). In addition, 
some studies showed that this type of growth strategy did 
not necessarily provide for growth at all (Baeck, Banathy). 
Therefore, there began a "vigorous denunciation of the 
growth-oriented development economics of the previous 
twenty-five years" as economists attempted to understand 
these developments (Arndt, 91). In doing so, they became 
aware that other disciplines had a great deal to contribute 
to the problems of economic development--including political 
scientists (Singer, 3). 
In the last decade, the concepts and goals of 
development have changed, not only in world scholarship, but 
in policy-making arenas. Many authors began to express the 
sentiment that political conditions could play a decisive 
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role in impeding or facilitating advances in economic 
growth. Their studies found that a high level of political 
development is quite favorable for economic growth and 
should be a goal for countries interested in further 
economic development. Once perceived as a mere technical 
problem of capital accumulation, economic development became 
looked upon as, first and foremost, a problem of political 
change (Baeck, Baran, Buchanan, Higgins, Girschman, Singer, 
Ward). 
Political Development 
As established above, the literature today seems to 
emphasize "a law of cumulative development" (Singer, 8). 
Development carries with it not only the idea of economic 
growth, but also of greater innovations in the political 
arena. The notion of political development is comprised of 
many factors, or indicators, that several theorists have 
exposed as the necessary elements that political systems, 
those whose decisions are binding on society, must develop 
(Easton, 112). 
The most basic elements of political development are 
effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness relates to the 
actual performance of the political system--the extent to 
which it satisfies the basic functions of government in the 
eyes of the members of society. Legitimacy involves the 
capacity of a political system to maintain its existence, or 
change when appropriate (Lipset 1959, 86). A government 
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should have the capacity to change in order to manage public 
affairs and cope with popular demands (Pye 1965, 13; Bill 
and Hardgrave, 78). If the people sense that their 
political system has the ability to absorb the developments 
in society and change accordingly, they will consider it to 
be legitimate (Almond and Verba 1963, 253). 
It is the notion of capacity with which many theorists 
are most fundamentally concerned. A political system's 
problem solving capability may determine its success or 
failure, for development is the result of the system's 
change. If the system does not have the capacity to change, 
then it cannot develop--and it is development that provides 
for a more effective and legitimate system (Almond and 
Powell 1966, 34, 105) 
The capacity for a political system to change is 
related to the one aspect of political development that is 
stressed most often--the creation of institutions. It is 
the shape of institutions in a political system that can 
reduce or increase the propensity to change (Coleman, 74-75; 
Huntington 1968, 5; Lipset 1959, 103). Political 
institutions, "stable, valued, and recurring patterns of 
behavior," take form in the developments of an autonomous 
legal system that adheres to a rule by law, an allowance of 
autonomous political participation, and an acceptance of 
universal standards of law (Huntington, 266; Pye 1966, 33-
45). In other words, a major step in the development of 
political systems is the emergence of an autonomous 
political infrastructure (Almond and Powell 1966, 29, 46). 
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An independent judiciary, according to theorists, is an 
essential institution. The other branches of government 
should not control the judiciary in any manner. It should 
be completely independent of any influence from the other 
areas of the political system (Bill and Hardgrave, 67-68). 
In addition, the written law of the land should be the only 
focus of the judicial system. Its decisions must be based 
on the rule of law and not applied in an arbitrary manner at 
either the judiciary's discretion or on command from another 
aspect of the government (Almond and Powell 1966, 29). 
Autonomous political participation relates to a 
government's acceptance of political activity that comes 
from the people, not mobilized by the government, and is a 
fundamental "pattern of behavior" a political system must 
develop. Private citizens should be allowed to actively 
voice their opinions, beliefs, conscience, and create 
associations independently rather than having such 
participation directed by the government. The actions by 
the people should be considered an influence on political 
decision-making whether it be directed toward "changing 
decisions by current authorities, toward replacing or 
retaining those authorities, or toward changing or defending 
the existing organization of the political system and the 
rules of the political game" (Huntington and Nelson, 3-6). 
Any and all means of political participation by the people 
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should be considered an influence on the decisions and 
actions of the government and should be established norms in 
the political system (ibid. 6). 
The third "pattern" or institution that must be 
demonstrated by the political system is the "acceptance of 
universalistic laws" (Pye 1965, 13). These laws may take 
the form of documents that have been drawn up, agreed upon, 
and signed by various nations around the world. A prime 
example would be the many documents that are produced in the 
United Nations. Nearly all nations of the world are members 
of this international organization and, therefore, they 
should each have a wide acceptance of the resolutions that 
are the result of such a "universalistic" body (Claude). In 
short, a developed nation-state that claims membership to an 
international organization should "operate effectively in 
[that] system of other nation-states ... [by] making and 
upholding international commitments" (Pye 1966, 37). 
Human Rights and Development. The requirements of 
political development--an independent legal system, 
autonomous political participation, and acceptance of 
universalistic law--have a unique relationship with the 
notion of political rights. These rights include, according 
to many international documents and national constitutions, 
the freedom from arbitrary law, the right to free speech, 
conscience, and association. 
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On the 10the of December, 1948, the United Nations set 
forth the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The 
preamble of this document states that "the inherent dignity 
and ... the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world." These inalienable rights include many that 
emphasize the very institutions that are a part of political 
development. 
Concerning an autonomous judiciary, the UDHR, in 
articles 7,9, and 10, states that "all are equal before the 
law and are entitled ..• to the equal protection of the law. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest ... or 
detention, [and] everyone is entitled in full equality to a 
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal" (UDHR, 8). Regarding autonomous political 
participation, articles 18, 19, 20, and 21 state that 
"everyone has the right to freedom of thought, freedom of 
opinion and expression. Everyone has the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association [and] ... has the right 
to take part in the government of his country" (ibid. 11). 
In addition to the UDHR, many other covenants on 
political rights have been established. In 1966, the 
"International Covenant on Human Rights" was constituted. 
In 1973, the "International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights" and, in 1975, the "Helsinki Final Act" were created, 
all reiterating the rights and freedoms set forth by the 
1948 UDHR. All of these documents, being examples of 
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"universalistic laws," are themselves related to the concept 
of political development. Since they speak directly to the 
criteria described above, a political system should extend a 
wide acceptance to these human rights documents in order to 
be considered developed. 
The relationship between political rights and 
development has been examined in many studies. The interest 
was on determining whether the governments of developing 
countries denied or guaranteed political rights to its 
citizens. The object was to determine which was most 
beneficial to a political system's growth. Political 
repression was found to be quite common in developing 
countries and, therefore, was often considered a necessary 
occurrence. More recently, researchers have asked 
themselves if the denial of these rights is necessary to 
develop From this question a whole new pattern of thought 
emerged (Donnelly 1989, 10). 
As was seen in the early economic development 
literature, the notion that economic growth would lead to 
great things for a country's well being created an obsession 
with development. A country's leaders, being caught up with 
the idea of economic progress, often chose to limit 
political rights to achieve growth. The belief was that 
repressing these rights was necessary to attain significant 
economic growth, but would only be necessary in the short 
run. As soon as the economy began to grow, and the 
political system became more stable, the repression could 
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end. In the meantime, the people would benefit from 
material gains brought about by a growing economy and would 
not be concerned about the denial of political rights 
(Meltzer, 35; Huntington and Nelson, 23). In short, 
political rights and development were seen as competing 
concerns (Donnelly 1984, 255). 
For many years, developing countries participated in 
what has been called "the liberty tradeoff." Political 
leaders believed that the exercise of political rights by 
the citizens may upset or even destroy the best-laid 
development plan. Elections may be suspended because 
"elected officials are likely to support policies based on 
short-run political expediency rather than ... insist on 
politically unpopular but economically essential sacrifices" 
(ibid. 257). The freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
association, when exercised, may create division, which the 
polity may not be able to endure. An elaborate and 
independent legal system may seem to be an "extravagant 
anachronism" (ibid.; also, Mitchell and McCormick, 478). 
All of the above "tradeoffs" were widely held to be 
necessary evils, although temporary and self-correcting. 
Researchers began to question, however, just how long the 
desire for freedom and self-expression could be bought off, 
even assuming that growth could be sustained in a repressive 
environment. Creating the "capability to generate future 
growth and development is an important element of virtually 
all definitions of development" (Donnelly 1989, 194). 
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As many began to ask if repression was truly necessary, 
a new pattern of thought was realized in that the 
deprivation of political rights, not their exercise, 
destroys development (Donnelly 1989, 196; Meltzer, 35). The 
government's necessary role in economic management does not 
require a "full-scale abrogation" of political rights. In 
fact, there may be significant benefits to the exercise of 
these rights. As previously established, political 
institutions, which inherently respect rights, are necessary 
in order to develop politically. Political development is, 
in turn, a prerequisite for economic growth. The 
establishment, therefore, of institutions that provide for 
the guarantee of these political rights may be beneficial in 
meeting the goals of economic development (Donnelly 1984, 
282; Donnelly 1989, 201; Howard 1983, 469; Mitchell and 
McCormick, 479). 
The recent trend that has emerged in development 
literature in relation to human rights is quite compelling 
and well welcomed by the people of the world who have 
suffered at the hands of their government. It has been said 
that only if people as a whole feel that they can 
participate in their government--whether by voting, 
associating, or expressing their dissent--and not feel they 
are merely recipients of government decisions, can human 
resources be mobilized for development. After all, the 
"ultimate purpose of development is to lay the basis for 
realizing human dignity" (Donnelly 1989, 202). A nation's 
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development is not undertaken only for the governing body, 
but for the people. It should not, therefore, destroy or 
degrade them in the process (Pye 1965, 12; Ramphall 21, 22). 
Conclusion. By reviewing the literature in the fields 
of economic development, political development, and human 
rights and development a relationship between the three was 
noticed. As a goal, economic growth may be realized after 
establishing certain aspects of political growth. The 
requirements for developing politically--creation of an 
independent judiciary, allowance of autonomous political 
participation, and acceptance of "universalistic laws''--
inherently respect political human rights. In addition, 
studies have suggested that the guarantee of political 
rights is beneficial to development because of the feeling 
of security it provides for the people. In the final 
analysis, political leaders must realize that their goals of 
development may not be achieved without respecting and 
accepting the rights of the people. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SOVIET UNION 
The Economy: An Overview 
Soviet history is "replete with abrupt, traumatic 
changes in social and economic conditions" (Millar 1990, 
186). Many events, such as World War I, the Revolution of 
1917, the civil war, collectivization, industrialization, 
the purges, World War II, and reconstruction, demanded a 
considerable amount of sacrifice and caused important 
changes in the economy. Since Stalin's death, change has 
been rather gradual. The reforms undertaken by the 
leadership of Khrushchev, and then Brezhnev, however, were 
quite significant. By the time Gorbachev assumed power, he 
confronted an economy that was quite different from the one 
that either Khrushchev in 1953 or Brezhnev in 1964 had faced 
(ibid). 
The developments of the 1930s, under the direction of 
Stalin, are critical for an understanding of the Soviet 
economy. The first was the implementation of economic 
planning whereby administrative and planning organs 
controlled and directed the economic life of the Soviet 
Union. Every economic decision was interconnected with a 
great many other decisions and involved a number of 
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"consequential effects'' (Nove 1969, 66). Operational orders 
had to flow to enterprises, plans had to be devised for 
various sectors and coordinated with other sectors. Orders 
given about what to produce had to be backed by the 
necessary materials, and output plans had to be related to 
input plans (ibid). 
The overall strategy of the central plan was to 
industrialize as quickly as possible. This goal was to be 
reached through steep rates of capital formation in order to 
satisfy the bias in favor of modern, capital-intensive 
technologies. Basically, industrialization was to be 
achieved through a highly centralized system. There was no 
room for failure as the Soviets sought quick results 
(Montias, 58; Nove 1959, 18). 
The second development during Stalin's years of 
leadership was the abolition of the New Economic Policy 
through mass collectivization of private and peasant 
enterprise (Millar 1981, 21-2). This set forth the final 
occurrence, in relation to the goal of industrialization, 
that the state preferred the worker in industry over the 
worker in agriculture (ibid 29). In short, the stress 
during the 1930s was on heavy industrialization with an all-
embracing role of the state in economic activity (Guha, 
104). 
Generally, the war and post-war years in the Soviet 
Union are often skipped because there is little known about 
them. It is known, however, that "the Soviet economy 
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suffered severe damage at the outset of the war, and a long 
and bitter contest had to be fought with less than pre-war 
economic capacity" (Millar 1981, 39). At the conclusion of 
World War II, the Soviet economy was almost twenty percent 
smaller than it had been at the war's beginning (Nove 1969, 
71). By 1950, the Stalinist system of central planning and 
industrial management with pre-war priorities had been 
successfully reconstructed. The main difference was that 
military spending competed for resources with investment. 
The cost of "maintaining a competitive military 
establishment in the chilly climate of the Cold War meant a 
slower recovery" than would have otherwise been possible 
(Millar 1981, 51). By the end of the decade, however, the 
Soviets enjoyed a significant annual growth rate of 5.9 
percent (See Appendix A). 
After Stalin's death in 1953, change was implemented 
and accelerated. It should be acknowledged, however, that 
Stalin succeeded in overcoming economic backwardness and 
establishing the Soviet Union as a recognizably strong 
power. He left a legacy of victory in World War II, of 
priority for heavy industry, of a highly centralized system, 
and of one man rule (Hardt, 16; Millar 1981, 53). 
In 1956 Khrushchev delivered his critique of Stalin at 
the Twentieth Party Congress, which led to the de-
Stalinization process. Modifications were designed to 
provide a higher priority for agriculture, light industry, 
and residential construction in order to accommodate the 
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needs of consumers (Millar 1990, 186-7; Sharlet, 321). 
Khrushchev provided for thirty-six million hectares of 
virgin land to become available as an incentive for 
agricultural production. Other Stalinist programs, such as 
the agricultural procurement systems where output was 
planned and prices were fixed, were abolished. In addition, 
parallel rural and urban Communist party organs were 
established. All of these efforts were undertaken by 
Khrushchev in his drive to de-Stalinize the country and 
affect further growth (Nove 1969, 99, 211; Millar 1981, 55; 
Millar 1990, 253). 
Growth rates during the early years of Khrushchev's 
leadership were significant, averaging close to six percent, 
and created a strong sense of optimism. The trend, however, 
began to decline in the early 1960s. As one specialist on 
the Soviet economy points out, referring to Khrushchev's 
shift in attention to agriculture, "the sectors into which 
resources were channeled were those of relatively lower 
productivity" (Millar 1990, 187). Although agricultural 
output grew at a healthy rate after 1958, it began to 
slacken. By the late 1960s, annual growth in Gross National 
Product had dropped and was averaging around 4.9 percent 
(Nove 1969, 39; Millar 1990, 187). 
Nikita Khrushchev, overthrown in 1964, was replaced by 
Leonid Brezhnev. The Brezhnev years did not witness large-
scale reform associated with further de-Stalinization. 
Brezhnev, along with his adviser Alexi Kosygin, "moved 
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quietly and cautiously forward, accelerating certain changes 
initiated under Khrushchev, slowing others, and reversing a 
few" (Millar 1981, 55). For the most part, they avoided 
system-wide institutional reform, but initiated a 
substantial increase in military spending, which became the 
hallmark of the Brezhnev years (Millar 1990, 253-4). 
The reforms of the Khrushchev era collided with the new 
defense policy of the Brezhnev regime as there emerged a 
further slowdown in growth rates. According to some 
specialists, this slowdown was partly a result of other 
factors as well, such as poor weather conditions, which led 
to a poor response from the large agricultural investments 
of the Khrushchev years (Kaneda, 53; Millar 1990, 254). 
Nonetheless, annual growth rates plummeted throughout the 
1970s from an average of 4.9 percent in 1970 to 2.5 percent 
in 1978. By 1980, the rate had come back up to .9 percent 
from a -.4 percent growth rate in 1979 (The World Fact Book; 
Millar 1990, The International Monetary Fund Studies; See 
also Appendix A). 
Economic growth during the 1970s (or lack thereof) was 
inhibited in part by the fact that innovation by Soviet 
enterprises was slow and uncertain. Costs of raw materials 
were also on the rise because of the "increased cost of 
locating, recovering, and transporting resources from the 
cites that ... [were] increasingly remote from traditional 
population centers" due to the fact that regions closer had 
been mined-out (Millar 1990, 190-91). In addition, the cost 
of maintaining control in Eastern Europe was significantly 
large and growing. By the end of his career, Brezhnev 
decided to coast, leaving the difficult choices of the 
future to his successors (Butler, 61; Millar 1990, 197). 
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Andropov's brief term in office brought a spurt of 
reformist thinking. He pointed out that the old system of a 
centralized economy had become obsolete and was an obstacle 
to further economic development. His program for economic 
reconstruction, however, followed the same logic of his 
predecessor and nothing was gained (Kaneda, 83). 
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev inherited an economy that 
was growing too slowly for his comfort. After so many years 
of stagnation it was time to elaborate new rules and 
implement major changes. Gorbachev's plans included a shift 
away from the priorities of Brezhnev, who he depicted as 
responsible for the country's long period of stagnation. 
Decentralization of the economy became the highest priority 
item on the agenda. (CSCE Report, 12; Heinz, 12; Rumer, 
332). 
The main program that Gorbachev initiated to reform the 
economy was termed perestroika (restructuring). Perestroika 
was supposed to generate new energy, higher rates of 
productivity, more innovation, and a more efficient economic 
system. Economic reforms were to establish a mixed economy 
with starkly reduced state planning, a robust private 
sector, and integration with the global market (Eklof, 13). 
In order to achieve such lofty goals, perestroika was to 
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work hand-in-hand with the policy of glasnost. Glasnost was 
designed "to restore the credibility of Soviet leadership" 
(Millar 1990, 269-70). This policy was created to enforce 
accountability of the government to the people and provide 
for significant political openness and change as well. 
Glasnost, then, was a means to achieve perestroika. It was 
a promise of political change--that Soviet leadership would 
be accountable for failures as well as successes, and that 
they would operate and make their decisions out in the open. 
In short, Glasnost was offered by the political leadership 
to the Soviet people as a token for their returned 
commitment to perestroika. It was also an acknowledgment of 
the notion that political development must be achieved in 
order to further economic growth. Gorbachev himself stated 
that "without glasnost, perestroika ... [had] no chance of 
success" (Gorbachev 1987f, 251; Millar 1990, 270). 
Soviet Politics: A Historical Overview 
The notion of political change is evident in 
Gorbachev's policy of glasnost. Even more, it is political 
change that is considered necessary for economic change--
glasnost for perestroika. Gorbachev made it quite clear 
that it would be impossible to carry out restructuring 
without changing the methods of state operation (Gorbachev 
1987f, 256). A brief understanding of Soviet politics is, 
therefore, a must and shall be followed by a detailed 
discussion of each aspect of political development--
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political rights and participation, the judiciary, and 
universalistic law--as it was practiced in the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union, from 1917 until shortly before its 
demise in 1991, was a one-party state in which the Communist 
party directed all aspects of society. Extreme central-
ization was established most rigidly under the leadership of 
Josef Stalin. His regime combined systematic terror and 
massive use of force with a democratically phrased 
constitution. The political system, operating ostensibly 
through a hierarchy of soviets, was actually run by the 
party leadership. Main decisions, made by Stalin personally 
and approved by the Politburo, were passed to the people by 
lower party organs (MacKenzie and Curran, 639-644; Reshetar, 
78) • 
Though this centralized system remained predominantly 
intact over the years, the leaders following Stalin sought 
to end the apparatus of terror. Nikita Khrushchev, who won 
the leadership after a short struggle for power, denounced 
Stalin's system of fear, relaxed some of the totalitarian 
controls, and sought to lighten up on strict centralization. 
His goal was to break from the past by stressing that state 
coercion was "withering away." He had much trouble, 
however, with opposition within the party, as many factions 
had been created, and he fell from power in 1964 (Lane, 112; 
MacKenzie and Curran, 765; Reshetar, 104). 
After Khrushchev's departure from the political scene 
there carne some significant changes in Soviet politics. 
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Under Leonid Brezhnev, the role of the party was further 
enhanced. It was to play an increasing role in "initiating 
major reforms, coordinating a complex socioeconomic 
framework and pushing forward a cautious and entrenched 
bureaucracy" (MacKenzie and Curran, 815). Not once did 
Brezhnev adopt a policy that decreased the power of the 
party, state, army, or police. In short, where Khrushchev 
had sought to lighten up on Soviet citizens, Brezhnev sought 
to keep and enhance central power (Lane, 120; Breslauer). 
Gorbachev came to power in the same way as his 
predecessors did--by making his way up the party ladder and 
solidifying power inside the party organs. He moved rapidly 
to consolidate firm control over the party and state and 
swiftly promoted people from his own team to the Politburo. 
After doing so he set out to correct the many problems--both 
economic and political--from which the Soviet Union was 
suffering. According to Gorbachev his moves were to consist 
of: (1) including the people in the administration of the 
country; (2) strengthening legality and law and order so as 
"to rule out the possibility of the usurpation of power and 
abuses by the government,"; and (3) adhering to "guarantees 
of the protection of the constitutional rights and freedoms 
of citizens" (Gorbachev 1988a, 12). 
Political Rights: The Constitution of the USSR. On October 
7, 1977, a new constitution was drafted and set forth as the 
Fundamental Law of the USSR. Although the document provided 
35 
for the overwhelming role of the Communist party in Soviet 
society, it also provided for the individual many political 
rights, which were to be guaranteed and protected by the 
Soviet state. Article 34 stated that "citizens of the USSR 
are equal before the law" (Constitution of 1977, 27). The 
right to participate in the state was provided for by 
Article 49, which stated that "every citizen of the USSR has 
the right to submit proposals to state bodies and public 
organisations for improving their activity and to criticise 
shortcomings in their work" (ibid, 33). Article 50 provided 
for freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, 
meetings, street processions and demonstrations (ibid). The 
rights to associate in public organizations "that 
promote ... [a citizen's] political activity and initiative" 
was guaranteed by Article 51 (ibid, 34). Finally, Article 
57 provided each citizen the "right to protection by the 
courts" (ibid, 35). 
These particular articles are singled out for attention 
because of their direct relationship to the historical 
suppression of dissent in the Soviet Union. since the 
communist revolution in 1917, the Soviet regime's attitude 
toward the political rights of Soviet citizens was dictated 
by the determination to retain power at all costs, to 
neutralize opponents, and to reshape society. Lenin began 
the trend wh~n he institutionalized labor camps and 
authorized nonjudicial convictions of persons considered 
------
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dangerous to Soviet power (Department of State, Human Rights 
in the USSR, 1) . 
After the death of Lenin, Stalin continued the 
repression. He routinely used terror to destroy political 
opponents and quiet dissent. The prisons that housed people 
incarcerated for political activity were often sights for 
construction projects and prisoners were forced to labor. 
Under Khrushchev, indiscriminate terror ended and millions 
of political prisoners were released from labor camps and 
prisons. His own campaign against religion, however, led to 
a sharp decline in the number of churches and clergy. 
Systematic repression of Soviet citizens who chose to 
exercise their political rights continued under Brezhnev and 
Andropov, which diminished even further the ranks of 
activists as many were silenced (ibid). 
When Gorbachev carne to power there was no immediate 
change in the repression of previous years. In addition, he 
inherited legislative, judicial, and administrative weapons 
for combating dissent. A few years after Gorbachev assumed 
leadership, however, dramatic reforms were implemented that 
had a significant effect on the plight of political 
prisoners. By the end of his reign nearly all Soviet 
citizens that had been incarcerated for political activity 
were released (this will be discussed further below) and 
attempts were being made at judicial reform (Sharlet, 323). 
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The Judicial System and Criminal Codes. Historically, 
Communist party control was extended to the legal and 
judicial systems in the Soviet Union. According to Stalin's 
constitution of 1936 the Supreme Court of the USSR headed a 
judicial system including the supreme courts in the 
republic, regional, and people's courts. Lower courts were 
to be elected and higher ones were to be chosen by the 
corresponding soviet. Judges, however, were always subject 
to party policies (Lane, 12; MacKenzie and Curran, 642). 
The Khrushchev era produced several statues mandating 
the role of the courts, as well as the first codifications 
of criminal and civil law for more than four decades. 
Together, these statutes created a system of courts that 
paralleled the parliamentary system. In 1955, the Statute 
on Procuracy Supervision gave the Procuracy, a large, 
centralized judicial bureaucracy, the power to supervise the 
execution of justice. The Procuracy itself approved 
warrants for arrest, conducted the investigation of cases, 
and exercised broad supervisory rights over court procedures 
and decisions. The Procurator General, who was in charge of 
the administration of the legal apparatus, was elected by, 
and responsible to, the Supreme Soviet. He appointed 
procurators at the Republic level who, in turn, appointed 
regional, local, and district procurators (Lane, 195; 
Reshetar, 261). 
The role of the courts, their manner of functioning, 
and their jurisdiction were laid down in the statute The Law 
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on Court Organization of the RSFSR, which carne into effect 
in 1960. At the top was the Supreme Court of the USSR, then 
come the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics. The judges 
that sat on the Supreme Court were, just as the Procurator 
General, formally elected by, and responsible to, the 
Supreme Soviet. At the base of the system sat the People's 
Courts. A professional judge and two lay assessors were 
directly elected to serve in these courts by general 
meetings of industrial, office and professional workers 
(Lane, 200). 
Individual procurators, under the supervision of the 
Procurator General, initiated proceedings against 
individuals or bodies. After an investigation the 
procurator prosecuted to the courts. The Procuracy's strong 
role was in assuring observance of the criminal codes 
(Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR, 8). 
The RFSFR Criminal Code carne into force in 1960, 
replacing criminal legislation that had been in existence 
since 1926. The Criminal Code specified: 
minimum and maximum sentences for each offense 
contained in it. For some offenses sentences may 
be imposed which do not involve any form of 
imprisonment: for example, the imposition of a 
fine, deprivation of the right to hold a 
particular type of job or confiscation of 
property. Five types of punishment involve or may 
involve, depending on the manner of the execution 
of the sentence, imprisonment or restriction of 
physical liberty: these are exile, banishment, 
corrective work without imprisonment and 
obligatory induction to labor of people sentenced 
conditionally to imprisonment (Prisoners of 
Conscience in the USSR, 78). 
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So called "socially dangerous" acts were punishable as 
crimes according to the criminal codes. Article 70, known 
as the "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda'' article, 
stated that: 
agitation or propaganda carried out with the 
purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet 
authority or in order to commit particular, 
especially dangerous crimes against the state, or 
the oral dissemination for the same purpose of 
deliberate fabrications which defame the Soviet 
political and social system, or the dissemination 
or manufacture or keeping for the same purpose, of 
literature of such content, shall be punishable by 
deprivation of freedom for a period of from six 
months to seven years, with or without additional 
exile for a term of two to five years (Syzmanski, 
272-3). 
Articles 190-1 of the Criminal Code were considered less 
severe. They stated that: 
the systematic dissemination in oral form of 
deliberate fabrications which discredit the Soviet 
political and social system, or the manufacture or 
dissemination in written, printed or other form of 
works of such content, shall be punished by 
deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three 
years (ibid, 273). 
In short, this article prohibited "circulating anti-Soviet 
slander" (Amnesty International Report 1990, 244). 
The Soviet criminal code also permitted administrative 
jailing for periods of up to fifteen days. In practice, 
such incarcerations were used to punish demonstrators and 
political activists under the guise of "hooliganism" or 
"disturbing the peace" (Department of State, Country Report 
1986, 1057). 
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Political Trials and Political Imprisonments. Political 
repression in the Soviet Union took many forms. The most 
common was arrest and imprisonment under articles 70 and 
190-1 of the Criminal Code. It was characteristic of 
political imprisonment that virtually all political 
prisoners were arrested, tried, and sentenced under criminal 
law for simply expressing some sort of dissent, joining an 
unofficial organization, or giving someone a bible. There 
were few exceptions to the procedures of political trials, 
although some people were confined to psychiatric hospitals 
without a trial. Psychiatric commitment of Soviet citizens 
for political activity could occur without passing through 
the judicial process and was often an indefinite punishment 
(Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR, 65). 
When accused of a political crime, a person in custody 
was "permitted to consult a lawyer only at the end of the 
preliminary investigation of his or her case. Thus, the 
accused is left without benefit of counsel throughout most 
of the pre-trial proceedings" (ibid, 71). In addition, most 
political prisoners were held incommunicado and, therefore, 
had difficulty obtaining a lawyer of their own choice. 
Usually the court would appoint counsel to the case. All 
practicing lawyers were members of the College of Advocates 
of their region or territory, which was supervised by the 
USSR Ministry of Justice. Nearly seventy percent of all 
lawyers were party members, as well. (USSR: Human Rights in 
Transition, 4). 
41 
Political trials were usually brief, lasting a week or 
so at most. Much of the time was taken up by the formal 
aspects of the case: the reading of the indictment; the 
final summing up of prosecution and defense; the "last word" 
of the defendant; and the reading of the court's judgement. 
Only a small amount of time was devoted to actual 
examination of the evidence and the issues. Supplementary 
witnesses that could bring in additional evidence were 
rarely allowed (Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR, 77; 
u.s. Department of State 1983b, 2). 
After the case was presented the three-person bench 
would retire to formulate the verdict and determine the 
sentence. According to articles 314 and 315 of the Criminal 
Code, the court's judgement must "summarize the accusation 
and the evidence, declare the court's ... [decision) as to the 
guilt of the defendant, and state the sentence of 
punishment" (Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR, 77-8). 
Normally, the judgement simply recited the original 
indictment omitting any reference to disputation raised by 
the defendant or defense counsel (ibid, 78). 
The convicted person would normally receive a copy of 
the court's decision within three days of its being issued. 
The person could appeal the judgement to a higher court 
within seven days. If there was no appeal, the sentence 
legally began at the end of the seven day period and was 
moved from the investigation prison to the place of sentence 
within ten days. In the event of an appeal, the sentence 
was temporarily suspended until the appeal was resolved. 
The court of appeal had to consider the request within ten 
to twenty days depending mostly on the level of the court. 
In the meantime, the convicted person was to remain in the 
investigation prison (USSR: Human Rights in a Time of 
Change, 8). 
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The court of appeal was to verify the "legality and 
well-founded nature" of the judgement of the first court. 
The appeals court could vacate the judgement, ask for a new 
trial or alter the lower court's decision (without 
increasing the punishment). The decisions of appeals courts 
were rarely in favor of political prisoners. After the 
appeal was considered, the convicted person's sentence carne 
into effect immediately (ibid). 
The numbers of political imprisonments in the Soviet 
Union varied over the years, and vary depending on the 
source, as Soviet leaders always considered this information 
to be a state secret. Estimates provided by international 
human rights organizations and the u.s. government reached 
as high as 10,000 political prisoners during the 1960s, 
'70s, and '80s--and this was considered by them to be a 
fairly moderate number. Organizations that listed and 
documented each political prisoner individually were able to 
identify approximately 300 to 900 political arrests and 
imprisonments each year during the '60s, '70s, and '80s. 
During the late '80s and into 1990 the number of 
imprisonments dropped significantly. By 1989 there were no 
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arrests being made for political reasons and approximately 
fifty remained in prison under political conviction (Amnesty 
International Report, Lubarsky, and Syzmanski; See also 
Appendix B). 
Most people who were imprisoned for political activity 
in the Soviet Union during the three decades under review 
were incarcerated for self-expression, association, 
religion, or dissent from government policies. According to 
articles 70 and 190-1 of the Criminal Code, these activities 
were considered criminal despite the corresponding articles 
of the Constitution that granted and protected the rights to 
dissent, associate, believe and express according to one's 
own conscience (USSR: Human Rights in Transition, 1). 
Universalistic Laws. In addition to the Constitution of 
1977, the Soviet Union was a party to many international 
documents that provided for basic political rights. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was drafted by 
the United Nations in 1948, was signed by the Soviets in the 
1970s. They also signed, in 1966, the International 
Covenant on Human Rights and, in 1973 and 1975, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Helsinki Final Act respectively. All of these documents 
reinforced the rights and freedoms that were provided for by 
the 1948 UDHR (Amnesty International Report 1978, 237-8). 
In 1976, the first Helsinki monitoring group was set up 
in Moscow. Its original proclamation was signed by eleven 
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activists, including former political prisoner Anatoly 
Marchenko. By 1977, comparable groups were established in 
other Soviet republics. Sub-groups were set up as well to 
monitor political repression at the very local level. From 
the beginning, these groups were warned about their "anti-
Soviet" activity (Amnesty International Report 1977, 277). 
By the end of 1977 the monitors carne under attack and were 
often tried and imprisoned. Their trials were marked by the 
same lack of standards for a fair trial of previous 
political trials: denial of access to counsel; long periods 
of incommunicado pre-trial detention; and the court's 
refusal to call witnesses named by the defense (Amnesty 
International Report 1979, 145). In some respects, Helsinki 
monitors felt the brunt of political repression as they were 
acting in accordance with international agreements and were 
considered to be shining a bad light upon the Soviet Union 
(Sharlet, 323). 
Gorbachev Era. During the first few years of the Gorbachev 
regime there was very little qualitative change in the 
proceedings of political trials. There was, however, a 
significant quantitative change in the numbers of political 
prisoners. Many political prisoners were released from 
prisons, camps, and psychiatric hospitals. In addition, 
unofficial groups and people who chose to express their 
dissent were shown more tolerance (CSCE Report, Reform and 
Human Rights, v). 
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Beginning in 1986, the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union began to make statements regarding the rights of the 
Soviet citizens being "instrumental to the progress ... [and] 
well-being of the Soviet society" (Rekunkov 1987, 24). The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs began to talk openly about the 
Soviet Union's humanitarian concerns. In February, 1987, 
several acts by Soviet officials resulted in the early 
release of many political prisoners. A total of 140 to 150 
prisoners of conscience (those being detained solely for 
their political or religious belief or activity) were 
released by the end of March. Another announcement of 
amnesty was made in June, 1987 and seventeen political 
prisoners were subsequently released (USSR: Human Rights in 
Transition, 4). 
In 1988, Soviet authorities released figures for people 
convicted under laws restricting political activity. The 
government had never previously acknowledged such 
restrictions, nor the imprisonments for them (Amnesty 
International Report 1989, 239) By November of the same 
year, 262 political prisoners had been released early and 
only four people were arrested concerning political 
activity--three of them were released without trial and one 
was acquitted. This was the first known acquittal in a 
political trial throughout Soviet history (USSR: Human 
Rights in a Time of Change, 5). 
The most praised change that took place in 1988 was the 
new draft of criminal law released by the government in 
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December. The draft, "Fundamentals of Criminal 
Legislation," was to replace the articles pertaining to 
"anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" and "anti-Soviet 
slander." In July of 1989 the draft was officially adopted 
and these two articles were abolished (Human Rights in 
Transition, 4-6). 
The year 1989 proved to be an exceptional year for 
human rights in the Soviet Union, despite the fact that 
there were approximately 110 people still suspected of being 
political prisoners in the country (ibid, 5). The Soviet 
government continued to take steps toward the release of 
these prisoners. In March, the international human rights 
organization Amnesty International was invited into the 
Soviet Union to get first hand information about how human 
rights were being respected. For the first time, Soviet 
authorities were not afraid of opening their doors to 
outsiders on the subject of human rights. This had not been 
the case during the days of the Helsinki watch groups 
(Charedeyev 1989, 21). Throughout the entire year, forty-
nine prisoners of conscience were released and arrests for 
political crimes had ceased (Knight 1988, 63). 
Throughout 1990, there was dramatic growth in the 
exercise of political rights in the Soviet Union. A human 
rights conference was held in Leningrad where Soviet 
officials met and discussed the importance of adhering to 
international standards of political rights in order to 
enhance their reforms (Democracy and Human Rights in FBIS 
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1990, 66). Progress was made in the judicial system, mostly 
concerning the appeals process. New laws allowed for 
judicial review by anonymous collegial bodies. The new laws 
concerning the press and expression specifically mentioned 
the new appeals law as a way to provide for a more 
independent judgement if arrested for political reasons 
(Human Rights Watch 1990, 373). As to criminal law, the 
Fundamental Law on Criminal Procedures was passed in April 
of 1990 codifying the presumption of innocence, and creating 
a right to counsel from the moment criminal charges are 
brought, or within twenty-four hours of arrest. Defense 
counsel would be granted unlimited access to their clients 
and to the investigative file (ibid, 373-4). 
In the same year, there was an opening in the political 
process with the establishment of open elections. In 
addition, new press laws abolished censorship and freedom of 
expression flourished as arrests for political activity had 
ceased (ibid). 
With the economy in rapid decline, there carne into 
being in many ways a more tolerant and permissive atmosphere 
that surrounded the political system during Gorbachev's 
rule. He admitted that the Soviet government "should 
implement a contemporary model of society, which would 
ensure for all its members civilized living standards and 
various opportunities to meet intellectual and cultural 
needs, freedom of choice and freedom of expression of 
opinions" (Gorbachev 1988b, 17). In the context of 
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political development, Gorbachev suggested a change in the 
relationship between man, society, and state. All of this 
stemmed from the need for perestroika to succeed. The human 
factor increasingly became the motivational force. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviet economy rapidly 
began to decline. Many studies have espoused various 
reasons for the decline in their economy, most relying on 
economic explanations. A review of economic development 
research exposed the notion that political development may 
have some effect on an economy, and may even be a 
prerequisite for growth. After further review of political 
development literature, certain requirements for such 
development were noticed. Developed political systems 
shared certain characteristics. Those most often stressed 
were the existence of an independent judiciary, the 
allowance of autonomous political participation, and the 
acceptance of universal standards of law. These three 
requirements for political development immediately evoke the 
notion of political human rights, which include the freedom 
from arbitrary arrest, the protection of the courts, and the 
freedom to dissent, associate, and participate in one's 
government. 
The ultimate objective of this project was to determine 
how the Soviet government met the requirements of political 
development by exposing its human rights practices and using 
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them as an indicator of such development. The reasoning was 
that if the requirements of political development were not 
established and practiced in the Soviet Union, the actuality 
of not doing so may have had an effect upon the declining 
economy. 
As established in the previous chapter, the Soviet 
economy began its decline in the 1950s. Though occasional 
growth spurts occurred during the 1980s, the rates were 
rather insignificant. By the late 1980s, growth rates were 
plummeting into the negatives. As each Soviet leader's 
version of how to effect growth in their economy was 
reviewed, it may be noticed that economic growth was 
greatest during the most repressive regime--that of Josef 
Stalin--and was the lowest during the least repressive 
regime--the latter years of Gorbachev. Despite Stalin's 
policies of systematic repression, terror, forced labor, and 
collectivization, he was successful in achieving significant 
rates of economic growth. Growth rates were plummeting into 
the negatives in the very last years of Gorbachev's regime 
when significant reforms were being implemented that were in 
favor of political rights. Could this, therefore, be 
evidence that more repression equals greater growth and less 
repression equals lesser growth? Not really. 
First of all, Khrushchev released many more political 
prisoners and lightened up on political activity more so 
than Brezhnev did. Yet Khrushchev's regime enjoyed much 
higher rates of economic growth than did Brezhnev's. In 
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addition, during Gorbachev's first few years in power when 
he began to show interest in the political rights of Soviet 
citizens and initiated reforms that were favorable to them, 
economic growth rates were higher than they were during 
Brezhnev's last years in power when approximately eight 
hundred political arrests and imprisonments occurred. The 
amount or extent of repression, therefore, is not 
necessarily going to determine the level of economic growth 
or decline--point being that the contention throughout this 
paper was not that the actual numbers of political 
imprisonments may have determined the growth and decline of 
the Soviet economy, but the mere fact that political 
repression did occur is indicative of a system that did not 
meet the requirements of political development. It is this 
occurrence--not developing politically--that may have had an 
effect on Soviet economic decline. 
Soviet Political Development 
The Judiciary 
The structure of the court system that existed in the 
Soviet Union was illustrative of a non-independent 
judiciary. The 1960 Law on Court Organization of the RSFSR 
provided that the judges who would serve on the highest 
court of the land, the Supreme Court of the USSR, were to be 
elected by and responsible to the Supreme Soviet. In 
modern, developed societies there should exist a judiciary 
that is independent of all other branches of government in 
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order to avoid arbitrary application of the law. Judges are 
supposed to be responsible only to the rule of law and not 
to any government official. The highly centralized system 
that existed in the Soviet Union did not allow for judicial 
independence as judges were subject to influence and control 
by the central government. The Soviet government, 
therefore, failed to meet an important requirement of 
political development. 
Further exposition of the above point may be found in 
the organizat~on of the Procuracy and the legal profession. 
According to the 1955 Statute on Procuracy Supervision, the 
Procuracy had the power to supervise the execution of 
justice. The Procurator General, who was responsible for 
the appointment of lower level procurators, was also elected 
by and directly responsible to the Supreme Soviet. In 
addition, lawyers had to be a member of the College of 
Advocates, which was directed by a ministry of the central 
government. An overwhelming majority of all lawyers 
(seventy percent) were also Communist party members. Again 
there existed an overlap in the branches of government that 
allowed for judicial proceedings to possibly be controlled 
(even if indirectly) by the central power through its 
direction of the Procuracy and legal counsel. 
Political Participation. 
The numerous arrests, trials, and imprisonments of Soviet 
citizens who chose to exercise their constitutionally 
53 
guaranteed political rights is somewhat indicative of a 
political system that did not (or would not) allow and 
accept autonomous political participation. Most of those 
citizens who were arrested, tried, and imprisoned on 
political charges simply sought to participate in their 
society. Some may have held opinions on government policies 
that were antithetical to official viewpoints. Others may 
have sought to organize groups to try to effect change in 
various government policies. Several were detained for mere 
self-expression. Whatever the case may be, the fact that 
political arrests, trials, and imprisonments occurred in the 
Soviet Union is evidence that the Soviet government did not 
allow for autonomous political participation by its 
citizens, and again failed to meet an important requirement 
of political development. 
Universalistic Laws. The abuse of political human rights in 
the Soviet Union was indicative of its government's lack of 
respect for and acceptance of universal standards of law. 
As previously established, the Soviet government was a party 
to many international human rights documents--The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on 
Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act--that provided 
for the basic political freedoms of dissent, association, 
expression, participation, and protection of the courts. 
These rights are enjoyed by most citizens of the developed 
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world. By repressing the rights of the people to exercise 
their guaranteed political freedoms, the Soviet government, 
once again, failed to meet an important requirement of 
political development as they did not uphold their 
commitment to political rights as established by the above 
documents. 
Conclusion. Three essential requirements for political 
development were not met in the Soviet Union during most of 
the period under examination. Obviously, the Soviet 
government's lack of an independent judiciary, allowance of 
autonomous political participation, and acceptance of 
universalistic laws cannot fully explain their lack of 
economic growth, but it may have played some role. 
Gorbachev himself acknowledged that political reform was 
necessary for economic reform when he initiated his policies 
of glasnost and perestroika. By the time he came to power, 
however, many years of repression had already taken its toll 
on the economic system. It cannot be denied that political 
repression did occur in the Soviet Union, and that this 
repression could be considered a sign of a political system 
lacking in development. Political systems lacking in 
development may have adverse effects on economic growth. 
The reforms initiated by Gorbachev were a step in the right 
direction and may have worked eventually, but much time was 
needed in order to turn things around. The effects over 
many years of a political system that needed development 
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could not be wiped away in only a few. The time was not to 
be had. 
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APPENDIX B 
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